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Abstrat: Last years have seen a dramati inrease in the use of omponent platforms, notonly in lassial appliation servers, but also more and more in the domain of EmbeddedSystems. The OSGitm platform is one of these platforms dediated to lightweight exeutionenvironments, and one of the most prominent. However, new platforms also imply newseurity aws, and a lak of both knowledge and tools for proteting the exposed systems.This tehnial report aims at fostering the understanding of seurity mehanisms inomponent deployment. It fouses on seuring the deployment of omponents. It presentsthe ryptographi mehanisms neessary for signing OSGitm bundles, as well as the detailedproess of bundle signature and validation.We also present the SFelix platform, whih is a seure extension to Felix OSGitm frame-work implementation. It inludes our implementation of the bundle signature proess, asspeied by OSGitm Release 4 Seurity Layer. Moreover, a tool for signing and publishingbundles, SFelix JarSigner, has been developed to onveniently integrate bundle signature inthe bundle deployment proess.Key-words: OSGitm, Seurity, Integrity, Authentiation, Jar Signature, Digital Signature,Felix.
∗ This Work is partialy founded by Muse IST Projet n°026442.
Déploiement séurisé de omposants pour la plate-formeOSGitm Release 4Résumé : L'utilisation de plates-formes à omposants a onnu es dernières années uneforte roissane, en partiulier dans le domaine des Systèmes Embarqués. La plate-formeOSGitm est une de es plates-formes dédiées aux environnements légers. Cependant, la miseen oeuvre de nouvelles plates-formes implique la présene de nouveaux risques de séurité,ainsi qu'un manque à la fois de onnaissane et d'outils pour palier à es nouveaux risques.Ce rapport tehnique a pour objetif d'améliorer la ompréhension des méanismes deséurité dans le adre du déploiement de omposants. Il se onentre sur la problématiquede la séurisation du déploiement. Il présente les méanismes de ryptographie néessaires àla signature des omposants OSGitm (appelés bundles), et le proessus détaillé de signatureet de validation de es bundles.Nous présentons également la plate-forme SFelix, qui est une implémentation sûre duframework OSGitm basée sur le projet Apahe Felix. SFelix omprend notre implémentationdu proessus de validation de bundles, onforme à la spéiation OSGitm release 4. Deplus, un outil de signature et de publiation de bundle SFelix JarSigner, a été développé demanière à intégrer la séurisation des bundles dans le proessus de déploiement.Mots-lés : OSGitm, Séurité, Intégrité, Authentiation, Signature de Jar, SignatureNumérique, Felix.
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Seure Component Deployment 71 Introdution1.1 Context of this ReportThe OSGitm platform is an exeution layer over the Java Virtual Mahine that supports lifeyle management of omponents (introdution, update, removal) during runtime. Theseomponents provide Java pakages or loally published servies (as Java interfaes) to otheromponents.This tehnial report aims at fostering the understanding of seurity mehanisms in theOSGitm platform. It fouses on seuring the deployment of omponents. It presents theryptographi mehanisms neessary for signing OSGitm omponents (also named bundles),as well as the detailed proess of bundle signature and validation.We present the SFelix platform1, whih is a seure extension to Apahe Felix2 OSGitmframework implementation. It inludes our implementation of the bundle validation proessin OSGitm Release 4 Seurity Layer. Moreover, a tool for signing and publishing bundles,SFelix JarSigner, has been developed to onveniently integrate bundle signature in the bundledeployment proess.1.2 Component DeploymentThe deployment of bundles is not dened by the OSGitm speiations. In the Felix imple-mentation, it is realized by the publiation of the bundles on a server on the Internet, andthe installation of these bundles from the server by the lient platforms. The steps of thedeployment proess are the following: publiation (1), bundle disovery (2), download (3),installation (4) and update (4.b), exeution (5). The gure 1 shows this proess of bundledeployment.
Figure 1: The Component Deployment Proess1http://sfelix.gforge.inria.fr2http://inubator.apahe.org/felix/
RT n° 0323
8 Parrend & Frénot1.3 Threats during DeploymentMajor seurity threats during deployment are of three types. The rst type is the preseneof maliious bundle publiation servers. The seond type of deployment threats is man-in-the-middle attak. Suh an attaker an modify the bundle, or fully substitute the loadedbundle by another one. In both ases the lient platform installs then exeutes some odewithout being able to do any assumption about the ode quality or reliability. The thirdtype of threats is the possibility that exists for an attaker to aess and modify (=totamper) the stored data used by the omponent platform. Atually, all onguration dataand installed omponents are available on the lesystem of the host, and aess to thislesystem is suient to fully ontrol the behavior of the platform and of the omponents.So as to protet the omponent platform from the rst two threats, it is neessary toontrol that the bundle publishers are trustworthy, and that loaded bundles have not beentampered with during the transfer over an untrusted network, suh as the Internet. Jarspeiations (bundles are spei Jar arhives) propose to sign arhive so as to guaranteesuh properties. OSGitm speiations propose additional restritions to signing, notablyby forbidding unomplete arhive signing, whih allows a third party to add resoures to anarhive without invalidating the signature.The protetion of the platform resoures requires to integrate a seure lesystem with theomponent platform. Bundle substitution or onguration tampering between download andstarting is then prevented. As far as it does not deal diretly with the problem of seuringthe deployment proess, this extension of the platform will not be onsidered further in thisreport.Figure 2 shows the seurity threats that exist during the deployment proess of a om-ponent.
Figure 2: The Seurity Threats during the Component Deployment Proess
INRIA
Seure Component Deployment 91.4 Maliious BundlesThe maliious bundles an be ategorized aording to the target of their attaks, andaording to the attak paradigm they use, that is to say the type of event that triggers theattak.Attak Targets Maliious bundles an be lassied in four main types aording to thetarget of the attak they perform:1. Threat to the System, for instane, a bundle an ontain JNI alls whih makes itpossible to aess the underlying Operating System; or it an have extremely resoureintensive servies whih onsume most of the available CPU or memory of the system,2. Threat to the Platform, a bundle an try and aess the Java platform (through theSystem or Runtime lasses), or the OSGitm platform,3. Threat to the Bundles, a bundle an misuse available servies (depending of the ser-vie API), or provide false servies, that provides a given servie with an improperimplementation,4. Undue Monitoring, a bundle an gather data related to a platform without makingimmediate use of them, and send them to a remote attaker for latter intrusion.Attak paradigms Three main attak paradigms an be used by maliious bundles. Theyare haraterized by the event that triggers the attak:1. Bak doors. Those bundles make it possible for a remote attaker to gain aess tothe exeution platform.2. Maliious servies. those bundles provide fake servies or lasses that an be usedinstead of valid ones.3. Autonomous bundles. those bundles perform maliious ations autonomously, withoutremote ontrol and without requiring servie alls from other servies. Their behavioris lose to the one of viruses.It is of ourse possible that a maliious bundle uses several of these attak paradigmssimultaneously.This brief presentation of the attaks that may our through maliious OSGitm bundleshighlights the need for seuring the life yle of the bundles, and partiularly for protetingthe deployment phase from maliious Bundle Repositories, from bundle substitution duringtransfer or from loal tampering during the installation phase.This tehnial report presents the mehanisms that are neessary to implement the bun-dle signature and validation proess. First, underlying ryptographi onepts are presented.Then, the algorithms for signing and validating an OSGitm bundle are detailed. And, lastly,RT n° 0323
10 Parrend & Frénotour implementation of bundle signature proess is presented. It is made of the SFelix plat-form - an extension of Apahe Felix OSGitm implementation- on the rst hand, and of SFelixJarSigner tool - that supports signing and publiation of bundles- on the other hand.
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Seure Component Deployment 112 Cryptographi Conepts and StandardsSeurity of systems is the ability of these systems to withstand the behavior of maliioususers. It an be dened as the onjuntion of integrity, availability for authorized users only,and ondentiality [AJB00℄. Identiation of authorized users is named authentiation.Seure bundle deployment means that these requirements are guaranteed during thewhole deployment proess, that is to say from the publiation of a bundle until the timewhen this bundle is started. It is based on asymmetri, or publi key, ryptography, whihpublily binds a given key pair with a unique user. This pair is made of a seret private keyowned by the user and of a publi key that is widely available. The private key is used toenrypt data. Every third party user an then assert that data that are deryptable withthe publi key have been enrypted with the private one.For eah of the seurity requirements that have been dened, a denition will be given, theryptographi mehanisms neessary for their enforement will be presented, and supportingstandards will be introdued.2.1 IntegrityIntegrity is dened by [AJB00℄ as the absene of improper system state alterations. Inthe deployment proess, this means that loaded bundles must not be modied between thepubliation step and the start step.2.1.1 Digital SignatureA `Digital Signature' is an eletroni signature that an be used to ensure that the originalontent of the message or doument that has been sent is unhanged, and to authentiatethe identity of the sender of a message or the signer of a doument. That is to say adigital signature guarantees both the integrity of the doument and the authentiation of itsemitter. We will onentrate in these setion on integrity. Authentiation will be presentedin details in setion 2.2.The overview of the proess of digital signature is shown in gure 3.
Figure 3: Digital Signature of a Doument using asymmetri Cryptography
RT n° 0323
12 Parrend & FrénotThis proess an be shared in two separate steps: the signature generation (A) by theemitter of the signed doument, and the signature validation (B), by the reeiver. Signaturegeneration onsists in applying a signature algorithm on the signed doument. This algo-rithm results in a data le alled Cryptohash, or more frequently Digital Signature. Thissignature is passed over from the emitter to the reeiver along with the signed doument.The reeiver an then hek whether the digital signature mathes the doument.The gure 4 and 5 show respetively the proess of digital signature generation and theproess of digital signature validation.
Figure 4: Digital Signature Generation Figure 5: Digital Signature ValidationThe proess of digital signature generation takes as input the doument to be signedand the private key of the signer. It produes as output a digital signature, or Cryptohash,whih aompanies the signed doument so as to prove its integrity. The rst step of digitalsignature generation is to apply a hash funtion to the doument, so as to obtain a xedlength data le that uniquely mathes the original doument (A.1). The resulting hash valueis enrypted with the private key of the signer, so as to guarantee that nobody else ouldhave produed this signature, and thus to prove that no maliious entity have provided ormodied the doument (A.2). The doument an then be publily published along with itsdigital signature (A.3).When a user wants to exploit a doument that is publily available, or that has beentransfered over an inseure ommuniation hannel suh as the Internet, it an then verifythat this doument has been issued by the pretended issuer, and has not been tamperedwith during transfer. The proess of digital signature validation takes as input the publisheddoument, the digital signature and the publi key of the pretended signer (B.0, B.2). Thevalidation is made of two parallel proesses. On the rst hand, the doument is hashed withthe same hash funtion that has been used for the signature generation (B.1). This stepprovides the hash value of the available doument. On the other hand, the digital signature
INRIA
Seure Component Deployment 13(=the Cryptohash) is derypted with the publi key of the signer (B.2). The hash value ofthe original doument is retrieved by this way. This step guarantees that no other persontries to impersonate the real signer. One the hash of the original doument and the hashof the available doument are available, it is suient to ompare them. If they math, theavailable doument is the one that has been signed. Otherwise, it means that the availabledoument is not the one that has been signed.The unvalidity of the proess of digital signature validation an have several auses.The more obvious one is of ourse the modiation of the doument, or the substitutionby another one. But the modiation of the digital signature itself has the same result.If someone has a valid doument without the original digital signature, it an not hekthe validity of the doument. Another ause of validation error is the lak of knowledgeabout the signer. When the reeiver does not have a opy of the publi key of the signerthat he knows to be valid, it annot validate the signature. Atually, anybody an sign thedoument and provide a valid signature for it. If you do not trust the signer, the digitalsignature an not provide the proof of integrity of a doument.2.1.2 Cryptographi Message SyntaxAnother onstraint exists in the veriation of a doument. The reeiver of the doumentmust have all neessary data for exeuting this validation, that is to say the doument, thedigital signature and the publi key ertiate of the signer. However, it an be neessary totrust doument issuers that are not known beforehand, that is to say for whih the publikey ertiate is not previously stored by the reeiver. Therefore, this publi key ertiatemust be provided along with the signed doument. Proess of trusting previously unknownsigners implies signature delegation, whih is presented in subsetion 2.2.This data availability onstraint means that several les must be transfered along withthe signed doument for veriation. It is therefore neessary to bind them together, soas to prevent omplex and slow doument exhange protools between the signer and thereeiver. A solution for providing the doument, the digital signature and the publi keyertiate of the signer is to integrate them in a CMS (Cryptographi Message Syntax)doument [Hou02℄3, and to publish not diretly the signed doument, but its assoiatedCMS le. This CMS le an ontain or not the signed doument, depending on the ontextof publiation.Figure 6 shows an example of a Cryptographi Message Syntax (CMS) ompliant File ina human-readable XML format.For enapsulating Digital Signatures, the CMS type `signed-data' is used. It ontainsdata neessary for validating the Digital Signature. Enapsulated data in this kind of CMSle is organized into two ategories: Signers data, and Certiates data. Signers dataontains the ID of one or several signer(s) of the doument, as well as the Digital Signatureof the doument for eah signer. Certiates data omprises X.509 Publi Key Certiates3CMS is a follow up to PKCS7 message format, dened by RSA Laboratories [RSA95℄
RT n° 0323
14 Parrend & Frénot
Figure 6: The ontent of a Cryptographi Message Standard (CMS) ompliant File.for the signers, and potentially a Certiate Revoation List. Moreover, the signed-data lean also ontain the signed doument itself.CMS Files use the ASN.1 syntax and are enoded in DER (Distinguished EnodingRules) format [Bur93℄. This makes it possible to integrate binary ontent suh as DigitalSignatures together with the name of the signer and the properties of the ertiates.2.1.3 Asymmetri Enryption and Hashing AlgorithmsThe proess of digital signature generation and validation makes use of two dierent kindsof algorithms: one hash funtion, and one enryption algorithm. Numerous ryptographialgorithms are available that provide one or the other funtionality. Although urrent re-ommendations for digital signature strongly restrit the hoie between the RSA/MD5 pairand the DSA/SHA-1 pair, the hoie of algorithm remains open. Atually, the requiredseurity level, the memory and performane onstraints of the system that makes use ofdigital signature an strongly impat the hoie.Commonly used Hash algorithms are MD5 (Message-Digest algorithm 5) [Riv92℄, SHA-1 (Seure Hash Algorithm) [Nat93℄, as well as SHA-224, SHA1-256, Tiger [AB96℄ andWhirlpool [Int04℄4. Table 1 shows the harateristis of these algorithms. The outputlength is the length of the resulting hash value. When several variants exist for a given algo-rithm, several output lengths are given. The seurity level indiates whether the algorithmis onsidered as seure. The availability indiates when a given algorithm is available in4Only SHA-1 or better algoritms should be used for signing douments, sine it is possible to build falseCertiates using MD5 in a ouple of hours [WY05℄. Theoretial attaks also exist on the SHA-1 hashfuntion, but are urrently not exploitable in pratie.
INRIA
Seure Component Deployment 15tools for signing arhives (XXX), regularly onsidered in speiations (XX) or available inAPIs but not integrated in existing tools (X).Hash Algorithm Output length Seurity Availability(bytes) LevelMD5 128 Broken XXSHA-1 160 Theoretially XXXBrokenSHA-224 224 High XSHA256 256 High XTiger 128/160/192 High XWhirlpool 512 High XTable 1: Main Hash algorithmsCommonly used enryption algorithms are RSA [RSA93℄, DSA (Digital Signature Al-gorithm) [Nat94℄, and ECC (Ellipti Curve Cryptography) [BWBL02℄. Table 2 shows theharateristis of these algorithms. The typial key sizes gives the key sizes ommonly usedfor ensuring seure ommuniations. For eah key, dierent lengths an be used dependingon the neessary seurity level. Several values are then given. The seurity level indiateswhether the algorithm an be onsidered as seure. The availability indiates when a givenalgorithm is available in tools for signing arhives (XXX), regularly onsidered in speia-tions (XX) or available in APIs but not integrated in existing tools (X). When available,the typial assoiated hash algorithm gives the hash funtion that is ommonly used withthe enryption algorithm.Enryption Algorithm Typial Seurity Availability Typial assoiatedKey Sizes Level Hash algorithmRSA 1024/2048 High XX MD5DSA 1024/2048 High XXX SHA-1ECC 160/192 High XTable 2: Main Enryption algorithmsThe hoie of pairing a hash funtion with an enryption algorithm is quite open, al-though one restrition exists: the length of the data generated through the hash funtionmust be at least as long as the enryption key. For instane, SHA-1 generates a digest of 160bytes (=1280 bits). The longest key an then be 1024 bits. For a more powerful signature,it is neessary to use a hash funtion with longer output, for instane SHA-256 (256 bytes= 2048 bits). A key of 2048 bits an then be used.
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16 Parrend & FrénotFor non strategi systems, the urrent trend is to use the DSA/SHA-1 algorithm pair.It is onsidered as suiently seure, and has the non-negligible advantage of ompatibilitywith existing signature tools.The digital signature of a doument enables to guarantee its integrity, that is to saythat a given doument is idential to the original one. In partiular, this aims at preventingdoument modiation or substitution. However, the guarantee of integrity requires thatthe reeiver trusts the signer of the doument. Consequently, it is neessary to authentiatethe signer. Otherwise, anybody an publish a le and provide a valid signature. Two asesof authentiation exist: either the signer is already known to the reeiver, or it is not, anda trusted third party is then required to guarantee the identity of all potential signers.Following setion will detail the authentiation proess.2.2 AuthentiationAuthentiation is the formal identiation of the emitter of a message. It onsists in theveriation of the validity of the identity of this emitter.In the ontext of Digital Signature, the emitter of the message is in fat the signer of thedoument. Its identity is arried along with the signed doument as a publi key ertiateompliant with the X.509 format. These data are enapsulated together in a CMS le. Theauthentiation proess implies to ompare this ertiate bound to the doument and theertiates that are onsidered as trusted by the entity that performs the authentiation.These trusted ertiates are stored in a database alled Certiate Store.2.2.1 Certiate ValidationTwo senarios of authentiation of a publi key ertiate exist. Either the Subjet, that isto say the signer of the publi key, is known to the entity that performs the authentiation,or it is not. In the seond ase, the authentiation an be performed if the Issuer of thepubli key ertiate (or one issuer of the issuer's ertiate) is known.The requirement for both authentiation senarios is that the set of ertiates thatare onsidered as trusted are transfered in a seure way to the entity that performs theauthentiation before the authentiation ours. The gure 7 shows this proess.The distribution of trusted ertiates is done in an initialization phase. A trustedCertiation Authority delivers the set of ertiates that the authentiating part an trustover a seure hannel (or possibly oine). These ertiates are stored by the authentiatingpart in its Certiate Store, and marked as trusted. This means that when the lient latterhandles a ertiate that is available in the Certiate Store and is marked as trusted, itwill be able to assert that this ertiate is a valid one. In other ases, it will not be able toverify whether a given ertiate whih Subjet is for instane SFRENOT is a valid one, ora fake one built by someone who pretends to be SFRENOT but who is not.The rst mehanism (Case 1) is shown on gure 8.
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Figure 7: The Certiation Distribution required for Certiate Cheking
Figure 8: Certiate Validation (Case 1): the Certiate is known to the hekerIn the Case 1, the authentiating part rst need to retrieve the publi key ertiate.In partiular, in the ase of Digital Signature transmitted through a CMS le, it extratsthe ertiate from it (1). Then it an hek whether this ertiate is already knownand marked as trusted (2). In our example, the signer is alled PIERREP. The Subjetof the ertiate is then PIERREP. It is possible to assert its validity beause the sameertiate for PIERREP (with same Issuer and ertiate signature) is marked as trustedin the Certiate Store.The seond mehanism (Case 2) is shown on gure 9.
Figure 9: Certiate Validation (Case 2): the Certiate is unknown to the hekerThe seond mehanism is made possible by the struture of publi key ertiates. Theyare either issued by a third party, or self signed. In any ase, they ontain two identitiesRT n° 0323
18 Parrend & Frénotthat are relevant for authentiation. The rst one is the identity of the Subjet, that is tosay the owner of the ertiate. The seond one is the identity of the Issuer, that is to saythe entity that has emitted the ertiate.The authentiating part rst need to retrieve the various publi key ertiates that arerequired to perform the authentiation (1). Then it builds the ertiate path, by linkingthe ertiate of eah Subjet with the one of its Issuer (2). The validity of the ertiatepath is asserted if the root ertiate that is to say the rst of the ertiate hierarhyexists in the Certiate Store and is marked as trusted (3). The ertiate path is onlyvalid if all ertiates used for signing other ones have the right to do it, whih is indiatedin the ertiate itself. In our seond example, the signer PIERREP is unknown to theauthentiating part. It is provided with the ertiate for ARES, who has been used toissue it, and the ertiate for INRIA, that has been used to sign the ARES one. Thevalidity of this ertiate hain is asserted beause both INRIA and ARES have the rightto issue ertiates, and beause the authentiating part knows the ertiate of INRIA.2.2.2 X.509 CertiateThe X.509 publi key Certiate is a data struture that enapsulates a publi key andassoiated data neessary for identifying a given subjet [HFPS99℄. It an be published ina CMS le, or as stand-alone data.The X.509 Certiate is digitally signed by the issuer of the publi/private key pair,whih thereby laims that the subjet of the ertiate is the owner of the assoiated privatekey. It also laims that he aknowledges that the subjet's name (alled Distinguished Name)is orret. Every user whih trusts the issuer of the ertiate will then be able to assertthe identity of the emitter of a message that an be derypted (or whose digital signaturean be veried) with the publi key ontained in this ertiate. This is the authentiation.This proess implies of ourse that the private key has not been orrupted.Figure 10 shows the ontent of a X.509 ertiate.Fields of the ertiate are the publi key, the name of the Subjet, the name of theIssuer of the Certiate, the validity period, the URL of the revoation server, and theDigital Signature. A additional eld allows to hek the validity of the ertiates, and isnot represented in this human-readable representation: the digital signature of the ertiateby its issuer.The name of subjets are dened by Distinguished Names (DN), whih originate inLDAP speiations [WK97℄. Distinguished Names are a omposition of following elds:CN=`Common Name', OU=`Organization Unit', O=`Organization', L=`Loation'(ity), S=`State', C=`Country ode'. Denition of Distinguished Names states that the elds follow ahierarhial organization, and thus that their order imports. For instane, a DN {C=Frane,O=INRIA} is dierent of a DN {O=INRIA, C=Frane}. However, in several tools formanipulating ertiates, suh as Sun Keytool, the order of the elds is xed, preventingsuh ambiguities.
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Figure 10: Content of a X.509 Certiate2.2.3 Certiate StoreA Certiate Store is a database that ontains Publi Key Certiates that the owner of theStore knows. Certiates an be identied as trusted and untrusted. It usually also inludesone or several private keys. It is then alled a Keystore5.The Certiate Store is proteted by a password. When private keys exists, eah oneis proteted by its own password. Consequently, a Certiate Store (or a Keystore) an beshared among several subjets, if the ertiate management is shared.Figure 11 shows the ontent of a Certiate Store: trusted ertiates, untrusted erti-ates, private keys.The onjunt use of a digital signature and a ertiate store allows to guarantee boththe integrity of a doument and to authentiate its signer. Both properties must applytogether. However, this mehanism, if it guarantees that a doument has not been modied5http://java.sun.om/j2se/1.5.0/dos/tooldos/solaris/keytool.html
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Figure 11: Content of a Certiate Storeafter its publiation, does not protet its ontent from maliious eavesdroppers. The thirdseurity property, ondentiality, an be used to ahieve suh a protetion.2.3 Condentiality2.3.1 DenitionCondentiality is the absene of unauthorized dislosure of information [AJB00℄. In theontext of omponent deployment, this means that the ontent of the omponent - ode orother resoures - is not available to users that are not expliitly authorized to manipulatethem.2.3.2 How to ahieve Condentiality ?Condentiality with asymmetri ryptography is ahieved by enrypting the doument withthe Publi Key of the reeiver (1). Thus, the owner of the mathing private key is the onlyone that an derypt the doument (2), and gain aess to its ontent.Figure 12 shows the proess of enryption and deryption of a doument for ensuringondentiality.Beause the doument is not enrypted with the private key of the emitter, this proessdoes not provide means of performing authentiation. In pratie, enryption for onden-tiality is used together with enryption for authentiation. Therefore, the reeiver of thedoument, after having derypted it with its own private key, an make the deryption withthe publi key of the emitter and thus ontrol its identity.2.4 ConlusionsSeurity requirements for omputer systems are integrity, authentiation and ondentiality.The rst property aims at verifying that the ontent of data have not been tampered with.The seond property aims at identifying the emitter of the data. Both steps an not beonsidered independently: if the emitter of a message is not authentiated, any maliiousINRIA
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Figure 12: Enryption of a doument for ondentialityuser an publish data with orret integrity validation mehanism. Similarly, if a messageis authentiated but its integrity is not guaranteed, there is no way not know whether anysingle byte of it has really been emitted by the authentiated emitter.The third property is ondentiality. It aims at proteting data from undue read aess.In this report, we will not onsider it further sine we onsider that aess to omponentresoures does not make it possible for a maliious user to gain aess to the omponentplatform.
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22 Parrend & Frénot3 Seure DeploymentThe important inrease of quantity and diversity in omponent systems makes it neessaryto protet them against maliious persons and systems. Components an be modied duringdeployment, or simply be published by untrusted issuers. It is therefore neessary to guar-antee the integrity of the omponents and the authentiation of their issuer. Condentialitywill not be onsidered further.Seurity mehanisms must not imply modiations in the deployment proess. Users(and platforms) must ontinue to use their omponent platforms and to update it withoutmodiation. Consequently, the signed omponents must be delivered as a single arhivewhih inludes both the original resoures and the data neessary for verifying integrityand authentiation. Otherwise, the seurity mehanisms are not transparent, they will berejeted by the users, and will not help improve the seurity of the systems.In the ase of OSGitm platforms, the solution onsists in inluding the digital signaturein the omponent (also named bundle) itself. Consequently, it is not possible to sign thewhole omponent. A list of resoures present in the omponent and of their respetive hashvalue is built. This list is the one that is signed, and inluded in the meta-data of theomponent along with the signature.This setion rst presents an overview of the entities that intervene in the seure de-ployment of bundles, of the requirements and of the proess for signing and verifying signedomponents. Next, it details the struture of a signed bundle as dened for OSGitm bundles.Lastly, the proess of signature generation and signature validation will be presented.3.1 OverviewThis subsetion provides an overview of the entities and data that intervene in seure de-ployment of bundles in an OSGitm platform. It shows how the digital signature an beexploited in the ontext of bundle deployment, so as to guarantee the integrity of a bundleand the authentiation of its signer.First, the priniples of bundle deployment are presented. Then, the requirements forsupporting a digital signature based seurity mehanism are presented, as well as the overallproess of bundle signing and validating.3.1.1 Bundle DeploymentThe deployment of a bundle is the part of its life yle that spans between the end of itsdevelopment and the moment it is ready to provide servies on an OSGitm platform. It on-tains several steps: publiation of the bundle, disovery, dependeny resolution, download,installation, onguration. Update phase must also be taken into aount [HHW99℄.Two main types of deployment an be identied. The rst kind is platform-initiateddeployment, whih an be seen as 'pull deployment', where the signal that triggers thedeployment originates from the omponent platform itself. The seond kind of deployment
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urs when it is initiated through a remote signal. This ours for instane in the ase ofonsole-based remote management of a omponent platform [RF06℄.The entities that intervene in the deployment proess are the following:The Bundle Issuer, it is the person or system that makes the bundle available for theend users. It an be a software developer or a software vendor.The Bundle Repository, it is the server that publishes the bundles, that is to say thatprovide a remotely aessible servie so that the end users an nd and download thebundles.The Exeution platform, it is the omponent platform that exeutes the bundles. Itmust support bundle deployment, and often initiates it. In this report, it is alsosimply alled the lient.The deployment proess is initiated by a deployment trigger. This trigger is either aloal shell (pull deployment) or a remote onsole (push deployment).Seuring the deployment proess implies that the exeution platform only deploys andinstalls bundles that ome from trusted issuers. As far as bundles are signed, they an safelybe published on inseure repositories. The deployment trigger, on its side, need to have aseure ommuniation hannel to the platform, so as to prevent deployment of bundlesby untrusted parties. Moreover, it must be proteted from undue use. The protetion ofdeployment trigger relates to system management more than to deployment, so it will not bestudied further here. We assume that only valid users have aess to the exeution platform.3.1.2 Requirements for AuthentiationSubsetion 2.2 has shown that the ondition for exploiting digital signature as a mean ofproving both integrity of a doument and authentiation of its signer is that the entitythat heks the signature (we will all it the lient) knows either the publi key of thesigner itself, or the publi key of the ertiate issuer that has provided the signer's key.Through signature delegation, a omplete hierarhy of ertiate issuers an exist betweenthe ertiate issuer the lient knows and the signer itself.In any ase, the signer must have a private key that the lient an trust, and the lientmust have a publi key that he knows to be trustworthy. Typially, both keys are providedby a ommon ertiation authority through a seure ommuniation hannel.Figure 13 shows the requirements for the authentiation proess: the publi key of theauthentiated part must be known to the entity whih wishes to perform the authentiation.One the requirement of key availability is fullled, the seure deployment an our.Next setion will present the internal struture of a signed bundle, and the way thedigital signature is used to sign not only one doument, but also all available resoures ofthe bundle.
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Figure 13: The requirements for the authentiation proess.3.2 Struture of a Signed BundleBeause of the partiular onstraints on the signature of a bundle, it is neessary to storeit and all related resoures in the bundle itself. Moreover, it is mandatory that multiplesigners an sign the same bundle.The struture of a signed bundle is shown on Figure 14.
Figure 14: Example of a signed HelloWorld bundle, signed by PIERREP.
INRIA
Seure Component Deployment 25Signature File and Digital Signature The Signature File of a signed bundle is a meta-data le thatthe ontain the Signature of the Manifest le, that is to sayits hash alue. It guarantees the integrity of the Manifest le. The Digital Signature of a le is a byte array that ontains thesignature of a given le by a given person, that is to say the en-ryption of the hash value of the signed le. In a signed bundle,the Digital Signature of the so-alled Signature File is storedin the Signature Blok File. It guarantees the integrity ofthe Signature File and the identity of the signerA rst solution for arhive signing (bundles are spei jar arhives) is given by the JarArhive speiations [Sun03℄. However, this gives the possibility to sign only a subset of anarhive. This implies that modiations are possible on the arhive even after its signature,whih is a potential seurity leak. Therefore, OSGitm speiations restrit the signatureby imposing that all resoures in an arhive are signed by the signer(s). In the ontraryase, the signature is not valid. Embedded arhives must be signed on the same way. OSGiSignature Files only need to ontain the hash value of the Manifest, hash value of the otherresoures are not required [All05℄.The Manifest le of the arhive (1) ontains the hash value of eah resoure in thearhive. To support several signers, the digital signature is applied not diretly on theManifest le, but on a so-alled `Signature File' (2), whih is spei to eah signer. Ahash value of the Manifest le must be inluded. The digital signature of this SignatureFile is stored along with data that are neessary for its validation in a CMS le of type`signed-data' whih is named `Signature Blok File' (3).This struture of a signed bundle will be enlightened by a simple example of the Hel-loWorld bundle, whose signer is named PIERREP. This bundle ontains three lasses: Hel-loWorldAtivator (the ativator, or starter, of the bundle), HelloWorldInterfae (the deni-tion of the HelloWorldInterfae servie that is provided by the bundle), and HelloWorldImpl(the implementation of the above mentioned servie).The meta-data of the bundle are the following. First, the Manifest le, MANI-FEST.MF, whih ontains meta-data spei to OSGi bundles, as well as the hash valueof all resoures. Seondly, the Signature File, PIERRE.SF, ontains the hash value ofthe Manifest le. Thirdly, the Signature Blok File, PIERRE.DSA, is a CMS lethat ontains the digital signature of the Signature File, and the publi key ertiate ofthe signer. They must be stored in this order (and before all other resoures) in the bundlearhive.A overview of the three meta-data les is shown is table 3. Spei harateristis ofeah if the meta-data les used for bundle signature are presented in subsequent paragraphs.
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26 Parrend & FrénotFile denomination Example ContentManifest File MANIFEST.MF Hash value for eah resoure in arhiveSignature File PIERREP.SF Hash value of the Manifest FileSignature Blok File PIERREP.RSA Digital Signature of Signature FileTable 3: Meta-data involved in Bundle Signature3.2.1 The Manifest FileThe Manifest le for the HelloWorld example bundle is shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15: The Manifest File for the HelloWorld Example Bundle.The Manifest le of an OSGitm bundle ontains the meta-data required for bundle de-ployment: the name of the bundle, its version, the pakages it provides, the pakages itdepends on, its ativator lass for starting it. In a signed bundle, this meta-data is enrihedby the hash value of eah resoure the bundle ontains. A resoure is identied by its fullpath inside the bundle. It is ompleted by a property that indiates its hash value. Theproperty name depends on the hash funtion that is used. In our example, this hash fun-tion is SHA-1, and the mathing property is `SHA1-Digest'. Note that a manifest le thatontains resoure entries that do not exist in the arhive or that does not list all resouresin the arhive has probably suered addition or removal of resoures and is not valid.Storing the hash values of the resoures of the arhive guarantees that none of thisresoures have been tampered with after the moment the bundle has been signed. Moreover,it guarantees that no resoure have been added or removed.
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Figure 16: The Signature File for the HelloWorld Example Bundle.Eah signer of a bundle reates its own signature inluding both Signature File andSignature Blok File. The name of those le is the apitalized name of the signer. TheSignature File is identied by a `.SF' extension. For instane, in our example, the SignatureFile is named `PIERREP.SF'.The Signature File of signed OSGitm is simpler that the one of signed Jar arhives. Asfar as it is not possible to sign a subset of the resoure, no opy of the list of the name andhash value of the resoures is required. Only the signature version and the hash value ofthe manifest is neessary. Hash funtion is usually the same that is used in the manifest foridentifying resoures. In our HelloWorld example, the hash value of the manifest is storedunder the property name `SHA-1-Digest-Manifest'.Storing the hash value of the manifest le enables to guarantee that it has not beentampered with after the moment the bundle has been signed.3.2.3 The Signature Blok FileThe Signature Blok File of a signed bundle ontains the digital signature of the SignatureFile and all data that are neessary to hek the validity of the signature. Its name is madeof the apitalized name of the signer. The le extension is the named of the enryption algo-rithm used for the digital signature. It is therefore either `RSA' or `DSA'. In our HelloWorldexample, the name is PIERREP.DSA.The Signature Blok File is a CMS ompliant le (see subsetion 2.1). It ontains thepubli key ertiate of the signer, and a SignerInfo data struture with the identier of thesigner and the digital signature itself. It an also ontain a Certiate Revoation List.The Signature Blok ontains a valid signature if the digital signature is a valid one forthe Signature File, and has been reated using the private key of the signer. Of ourse,the validation proess must hek whether the publi key ertiate an be trusted (seesubsetion 2.2). It guarantees that the Signature File has not been modied sine thesignature ourred, and that the signer is a trustworthy one.The reader an refer in the Figure 6 for an example of a Signature Blok File.One the struture of a signed bundle and of its meta-data les have been presented, thealgorithms used for signing the bundle, and for validating this signature, will be detailed.
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28 Parrend & Frénot3.3 The Proess of Signature and ValidationThe proess of signing bundle must reate bundle meta-data that are ompliant with pre-sented speiations. Not only the meta-data ontent must be valid, but several otheronstraints must also be onsidered: the order of resoures in the arhive and the exhaus-tiveness of identied resoures.Of ourse, the proess of validation of the bundle signature must hek the same on-straints.3.3.1 SignatureThe main steps of bundle signature generation are the following. First, the publi/privatekey pair must be available before signing. This is the initialization phase. Next, the manifestle, MANIFEST.MF, is generated. It ontains the name of every resoure in the bundlealong with their hash value. Then, the Signature le is generated. It ontains the hashvalue of the manifest le. The Signature Blok File is generated, and ontains the digitalsignature of the Signature File, and the publi key ertiate of the signer. Lastly, the wholearhive is generated, the meta-data are sorted rst, and then the other resoures.Figure 17 shows the algorithm for signing a bundle. You an refer to gure 25 fromAnnexe 6.3 for further details.
Figure 17: The Algorithm for signing a Bundle.
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Seure Component Deployment 293.3.2 ValidationThe proess of bundle signature validation is symmetri to the signature generation one.First, the entity that heks the signature needs to authentiate the signer, that is to say tohek whether it knows its publi key ertiate or it is apable of establishing a CertiatePath between this publi key ertiate and a ertiate he knows (see subsetion 2.2). Ifthe signer an not be authentiated, it is not worth trying to verify the signature, beauseanybody an build a valid signature.The seond step of the validation of bundle signature is the veriation of the orretorder of the resoures in the arhive. As already mentioned, the rst les must be in thisorder the Manifest le, the Signature File and the Signature Blok File. All other resouresome afterwards.The third step is the validation of the oherene of the meta-data les. The SignatureBlok File must ontain a valid digital signature of the Signature File by the signer. TheSignature File must ontain the orret hash value for the manifest le. The Manifest lemust ontain the hash value for all resoures of the arhive, without exeption, and withoutomission.When these three steps are heked and valid, the signature of the bundle is valid. Shouldany of the riteria not be met, the bundle signature is not valid.Figure 18 shows the algorithm for validating a signed bundle. You an refer to gure 26from Annexe 6.3 for further details.
Figure 18: The Algorithm for Validating a signed Bundle.
RT n° 0323
30 Parrend & Frénot3.4 ConlusionsSeuring the deployment of omponents implies to protet the exeution platform frommaliious omponent publishers, and from potential modiations of the omponents aftertheir publiation. Suh protetion is ahieved in the ase of OSGitm bundles by the signatureof the bundles, whih is based on digital signature and enables to store the signature itselfand related data inside the bundle itself. The protetion of bundles is done through twosteps. First, the bundle is signed by a bundle publisher that is publily known. Seondly,the bundle signature is validated just before being installed, so as to hek that the signatureis valid and that the bundle has not suered modiations.Suh a proess does not prevent maliious eavesdropper to steal the ontent of the om-ponent. This protetion level would require ondentiality, and an not be ahieved bysimple integration of meta-data in the omponent. It requires enryption of the omponent,whih makes neessary to have a dediated key management faility. Moreover, it wouldbreak the ompatibility of published omponents with unseured platforms.
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Seure Component Deployment 314 Implementation: SFelixSFelix6 is the implementation of the bundle signature validation proess of the OSGitmspeiation, whih is a part of OSGitm Seurity Layer. It is provided together with theSFelix JarSigner tool, whih enables to sign bundles and to publish them on a FTP server. Italso provides the possibility to update the repository meta-data le for the OSGitm BundleRepository version 2 (OBR 2). SFelix is based on the Felix7 implementation of the OSGitmplatform. Felix is a projet from the Apahe Inubator, and is a follow-up of Osar OSGitmplatform8.To the extent of our knowledge, no other implementation of bundle signing and validationfaility exists for the OSGitm platform. SFelix is then the rst projet to provide it, at leastin the Felix Projet. Moreover, no Java implementation of a jar arhive signer seems tobe available as open soure projet. A tutorial exist on the OnJava web site, but uses Sunlibraries that have been removed from the Java Virtual Mahine distribution9.It has thus been neessary to implement the whole bundle signature and validationproess in SFelix. An implementation of the algorithms for signature and validation havebeen developed (see subsetion 3.3).4.1 OverviewWe rst present an overview of the priniples of the SFelix seure omponent deploymentappliation. It is made up of the platform and of the JarSigner tool. The preise role of theappliation is detailed, then the struture of the program and its publi API are explained.4.1.1 Role of SFelix platform and SFelix JarSignerSFelix JarSigner and SFelix over the whole deployment proess of omponents.SFelix JarSigner overs the issuer side of the bundle deployment proess. It allows abundle issuer to sign the bundle, and to publish them on a publi repository. Currently,only the FTP protool is supported for le transfer, but an extension towards other protoolssuh as SSH or FTP/TLS is foreseen. Moreover, SFelix supports the update of the meta-data of the bundle repository. These meta-data are a spei le that ontains a desriptionof bundles that are available on a given (or even several) bundle repositories. They are usedby lient to disover whih bundles are available for download and installation, and to installthem together with other bundles that are required for dependeny resolution.SFelix overs the lient-side part of the deployment proess. It validates all existing bun-dles at the platform launh time. Only valid bundles are installed, other one are ignored. Inthe ase of the installation of new bundles, these latter are heked before their installation.This is done independently of the loation of the bundle, being stored loally or retrieved6http://sfelix.gforge.inria.fr/7http://inubator.apahe.org/felix/8http://osar.objetweb.org/9http://www.onjava.om/pub/a/onjava/2001/04/12/signing_jar.html
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32 Parrend & Frénotfrom a bundle repository. Valid bundles are installed, unvalid ones rejeted. During bundleupdate, the same veriation ours.SFelix bundle validation ours independently of the type of deployment trigger. Itsupports push deployment (initiated from the platform) as well as pull deployment (initiatedfrom a remote shell or onsole).4.1.2 Struture of the ProgramThe general arhiteture of SFelix is the following. The seurity layer (whih inludes thebundle validation faility) is provided as a library used by the OSGitm platform. This onehas been slightly modied so as to hek the validity of the signature of a bundle beforeinstalling it. The SFelix signer tool is provided as OSGitm bundles.Figure 19 shows the general arhiteture of the Seure Felix (SFelix) platform.
Figure 19: The general Arhiteture of the Seure Felix (SFelix) Platform.4.1.3 The APIThe API of SFelix is really simple. It is made of a method for signing bundles, and anotherone for validating their signature.The signature API is provided by the lass fr.inria.ares.jarsigner.JarSigner. The methodis named sign(), and takes as parameter the Jar le that is to be signed, the name of thele where the signed bundle is to be stored, as well as the name of the signer, the passwordto aess the Keystore, and the password that protets the private key of the signer.
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ure Component Deployment 33The signature validation API is provided by the lass fr.inria.ares.jarvalidation.JarValidation.The single method is named hek(), and takes as parameters the bundle to be veried (asa File objet) and the password of the Keystore.Figure 20 shows the publi Appliation Programming Interfae (API) of the SFelix plat-form.
Figure 20: The publi API of the Seure Felix (SFelix) Platform.Next subsetion will present with more detail the SFelix bundle signature validationfaility, as well as modiation that have been done to Felix to integrate this additional stepon the deployment proess.4.2 Felix Modiations for Bundle ValidationSo as to support bundle validation, the algorithm presented in subsetion 3.3 must be im-plemented, and exeuted for eah bundle that is installed (or updated) on the platform.Moreover, the Felix platform must be slightly modied so as to integrated the stage ofbundle validation in the installation proess. These modiations build the bridge betweenthe Felix and SFelix platforms. Modiations to the ode will be presented, as well as theexeution proess at launh time and at runtime.4.2.1 The CodeThe validation API, JarValidation, is provided as a separated library that is loaded at thelaunh time of the OSGitm platform. This library is alled immediately before the eetiveinstallation of eah bundle. When the bundle is valid, installation is proessed normally. Inthe ontrary ase, the installation aborts and the bundle is removed from the list of availablebundles. All following bundles are heked and installed aording to the same proess.The integration of the bundle validation proess only requires the modiation of threelasses, BundleArhive, BundleCahe and Felix, and the addition of the DefaultSeure-BundleArhive lass. All remaining ode is provided in a separate library, jarvalidation.jar,whih is required by the SFelix platform at launh time.
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34 Parrend & Frénot4.2.2 Launh Time of the SFelix PlatformThe SFelix platform aims at preventing maliious bundles to be installed and exeuted. Itneeds to ahieve its goal while limiting as muh as possible the interation with its user(or manager). The seurity mehanisms must be as transparent as possible, so as to avoiddeterring the users from exploiting them. For guaranteeing that the installed bundles arevalid, it is neessary to be able to assert that the platform itself has not been tamperedwith. The validation proess therefore ours in two steps. First, the platform ode mustbe veried. Seondly, the platform, that is known to be valid, heks eah installed bundles.The validation of the platform ode itself an be done manually through arhive signingin a way similar to the bundle validation. However, in our ase, the integrity of the platformode is simply veried through its hash value. The launh sript ontaining original hashvalues is publily available online on the projet web site. Its exeution guarantees thevalidity of the ode arhive.The platform an then safely hek the validity of the signature of external bundles. Atlaunh time, all bundles are validated before their installation. If one bundle is not valid, itis simply rejeted, and the installation of the other bundles goes on. For eah bundle thatis orretly installed, a onrmation of installation is printed in the shell to the user.The only interation between the platform and the user ours through the (S)Felix shellduring the validation of the rst bundle. The user is asked for the password of the Keystore,whih is neessary to retrieve the list of ertiate that are onsidered trustful. Afterwards,the password is stored in the ore of the platform, and reused for eah validation of a bundle.Sine the omponents only have aess to the platform through the bundle ontext, and notdiretly, this way of storing the password is sound.The following ode (Figure 21) show the output when launhing a new OSGitm prolewith SFelix. Note the password request and the notiation of bundle validation.4.2.3 Runtime of the SFelix PlatformWhen bundles are installed during the runtime of the platform, or when bundles are updated,the same veriation proess ours. Valid bundles are installed, and invalid one rejeted.This is of ourse true independently of the loation of installed bundles, whish an be loalor stored in a remote repository.Figure 22 shows a sreen-shot of the Felix shell when trying to install an unsigned bundle.The SFelix platform enables to validate all bundles that are exeuted before their in-stallation. The orretness of the validation proess is guaranteed by the veriation ofthe platform ode before launhing the platform. In our urrent implementation, this issimply ahieved through hash-value based veriation of the ode. More omplete solutionsare neessary to ahieve high level seurity, but depends on the exeution ontext of theplatform.The existene of a seure OSGitm platform that validates bundles before installing themmakes it neessary to have a tool available that support the proess of signing them. We
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Figure 21: Sreen-shot of SFelix shell when launhing a new SFelix Prole-
Figure 22: Sreen-shot of SFelix shell when trying to install an unsigned bundle
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36 Parrend & Frénottherefore developed SFelix JarSigner. So as to support the whole deployment proess, anadditional faility is inluded that enables to publish signed bundles in a remote le reposi-tory.4.3 Tool: SFelix JarSignerThe SFelix JarSigner tool aims at supporting the publiation part of the proess of om-ponent deployment. The publiation is made of the signing of the bundles, and of theirtransfer to a publi bundle repository. The funtions of SFelix JarSigner are rst presented,and the various bundles that ompose it are detailed.4.3.1 Funtions of JarSignerJarSigner Graphial User Interfae is omposed of three main parts. The rst aims at theonnetion to the Keystore. The seond deals with bundle signing. The third is dediatedto the publiation of bundles onto a remote repository. The Keystore aess takes as input the name (Alias) of the person that wants tosign bundles. It also takes the general password of the Keystore, that enables to aessthe list of trusted ertiates, and the password that protets the private key of thesigner. The 'Open Session' button makes it possible to hek the partiular algorithmthat is bound to the urrent alias. The le signing part enables to speify the name of the bundle that is to be signed, aswell as the name of the future signed bundle. Note that these names must be dierent.Several ations over the bundle an be realized. It an of ourse be signed, but it analso simply be heked. When signing or heking a bundle through the 'Treat Bundle'button, the output of the proess (suess/failure) is printed in a spei informationeld at the bottom of the window. Moreover, bundles that are signed orretly orwhih signature is validated are added to the 'Seleted Bundle' list, that makes itpossible to hose whih bundle is to be published. The publiation faility of SFelix ontains the above mentioned 'Seleted Bundle'list, a list of le servers, and a 'Load File(s)' button that triggers the publiation. Avail-able bundles are exlusively the signed ones, but le servers an be added, modiedand removed by the user of SFelix JarSigner.Figure 23 shows the Graphial User Interfae of the SFelix JarSigner tool. The dierentparts of the tool that have been presented in this setion an be observed.The modular organization of SFelix JarSigner will then be presented.4.3.2 Bundles of JarSignerSFelix JarSigner is an OSGitm appliation. It is a tool that makes it possible to seurebundle deployment, and is itself made up of validated bundles: it is exeuted in the SFelixINRIA
Seure Component Deployment 37
Figure 23: The Graphial User Interfae of the SFelix JarSigner Tool.
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38 Parrend & Frénotplatform. To exeute it in another OSGitm platform would require to make the jarvalidationlibrary available as an arhive. This is quite easy to ahieve, but, sine it is not ompliantwith OSGitm speiations, it is out of the sope of this study.SFelix is built of three sets of ode. The rst one is the jarvalidation library. Theseond one is a lightweight plug-in support we developed for graphial interfaes namedomponentGui. The last one is of ourse the JarSigner tool itself.The jarvalidation library provides the ryptographi library, the library for aessing tothe Keystore, as well as the bundle validation API whih is also used in JarSigner.The omponentGui faility is provided as a set of two bundles. The rst one is named`SFelix Utilities', and provides various libraries for graphial interfaes elements. The seondone is named `Generi Frame', and provides a simple graphial window that ontains the listof all Graphial User Interfaes that are available in the platform. These GUIs are taggedby the fr.inria.ares.sfelix.utils.GuiSwingComponent programming interfae they implement.They are made available as OSGitm servies.The JarSigner tool is omposed of two bundles, `Jar Signer', whih provides the serviefor signing bundles, and `Jar Signer GUI', whih provides the graphial interfae that allowsto aess the signature servie. This interfae have been presented in the previous subsetion.The following ode (gure 24) shows the output when launhing SFelix JarSigner. Theonrmation of the validation of the signature is printed for eah bundle, and the variousbundles that were presented are listed.4.4 ConlusionsIn this setion, the SFelix platform and the SFelix JarSigner tool have been presented.Used together, they support the whole proess of seure deployment for OSGitm bundles:signature, publiation, and remote installation through the OBR 2 bundle repository if thebundles have a valid signature. SFelix is based on the Felix OSGitm implementation: allbundles that run in SFelix also run on Felix, but Felix bundles need to be signed by a knownperson before being integrated in the seure SFelix platform.
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Figure 24: Sreen-shot of SFelix shell when launhing the SFelix JarSigner Tool
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40 Parrend & Frénot5 ConlusionsUntil now, only very few eort seems to have been dediated to seuring omponent plat-forms. Due to the even broader dissemination of suh platforms, it appears to be neessaryto foster knowledge about seurity issues in omponent platforms. This work intends tomake it possible for not seurity speialists to take suh stakes into aount when build-ing a system based on a omponent platform. It is targeted to the OSGitm platform, butpresented onepts an easily be mapped towards other omponents systems.This tehnial report gives a detailed overview of mehanisms that intervene duringomponent signature and validation, inluding the ryptographi onepts that are neessaryto understand the whole proess.Mathing implementation of bundle signature and validation is introdued. Bundle vali-dation is part of OSGitm Release 4 Seurity Layer, and is as suh integrated in the OSGitmframework. Our implementation is available in the SFelix framework,whih is an extensionof the Felix OSGitm implementation. Bundle signature is provided as a stand-alone applia-tion, SFelix JarSigner. This tool also supports publiation of bundle in publily aessibleservers.This work has brought to light further needs for seurity in omponent platforms. Inpartiular, bundle validation implies that lients hava reliable informations about the signer.Several questions emerge: how to make sure lients have aess to all bundle they are allowedto install ? How to restrit the aess from ertain lients to ertain signers ? How to dealwith new signers ? And how to deal with previous signers that are no longer allowed topublish bundles ? Moreover, it an sometime be neessary to be able to revoke isolatedbundles, without preventing valid bundles to be installed.
INRIA
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ure Component Deployment 416 Annexes6.1 Existing Tools for Seure Java AppliationsExisting tools that are add-ons to the Java Virtual Mahine are jar signing failities, andlass iphering software.Signing Jars Some failities already exist for signing jar. The main one is Sun Jarsigner[Sun04℄, that provides a ommand line utility for signing jars. It resembles muh to OSGiSeurity Layer, but has a dierent approah: it is no Java program, but a ommand line tool. This is not onsistent with OSGispeiation, whih states that the Seurity Layer is plaed between the Java VirtualMahine and OSGi platform, one an not assume that an OSGi platform exeuting in a previsouly unknown en-vironnement have neessary rights to exeute third party program through JNI, northat this third party program (here Sun Jarsigner) is available and last but not least, OSGi speiation brings its own ontraints on arhive signaturethat are not speied by Jar speiation, and thus not enfored by Sun Jarsigner.Moreover, no readily available library for signing jar is available. One implementationhas been proposed by Ra Krikorian in an On-Java artile. However, this implementationuse a Sun API that is no longer supported, as far as it has been proved to be inseure.Ciphering of Classes Besides signing arhive, an other way to protet lasses is to en-rypt them, and to derypt them only at runtime for the exeution. This tehnique enablesto guarantee not only integrity of soures and authentiation of the emitter, but also on-dentiality against potential maliious third parties.All suh libraries that are available are not free. Two of them, Canner and Katirya,are urrently only available for the Mirosoft Windows environment. Canner, by CinnabarSystems10, reates an exeutable le that then exeutes on the loal JVM. Katirya11 worksaording to the same priniple. jLok is the only tool that do not only work on MSWindows.It pathes the Virtual Mahine so as to integrate runtime deryption of enrypted lasses12.Available tools for ensuring seurity in Java appliations are still quite limited. This isexplained by the fat that most seurity problems are appliation and environnement spei.Therefore, eort for improving seurity in java system is either entered on the VirtualMahine itself - whih does its job in a quite satisfatory manner - or on providing tool setsfor spei appliations. It is thus neessary to developp our own tools for implementingOSGi Seurity Layer.10http://www.innabarsystems.om/anner.html11http://www.mygiserver.om/∼ipnetdevelop/katirya.html12http://www.jbitsoftware.om/JBit/do/displayPage?targetPageId=produts.jlokinfo
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42 Parrend & Frénot6.2 Java Cryptographi LibrariesDevelopping our own tools for enforing Java seurity means providing a generi seurityAPI for signing and verifying jars. Suh an API needs to releave on a valid implementationof ryptographi algorithms for hash value, digital signature and enryption. Suh an im-plementation is of ourse out of sope of our work, and several ryptographi libraries havebeen developped reently.This libraries an easily be plugged in java programs through the provider mehanism:by indiating the abbreviation mathing an available provider at a ryptographi methodall, the aller ensures that this provider is the one that performs the ryptographi oper-ation. This makes it possible to integrate third party providers, but also to validate themindependantly of their appliations.A list of seurity provider is maintained by Sun 13. The prinipal open soure ryp-tographi library has been developped by the Legion of the Bouny Castle14. However,for appliations that need more than a basi level of seurity, these ryptographi librariesneed to be validated. The referene organization for ryptographi module validation isthe Amerian National Institute of Standards and Tehnology (NIST) that has developpedthe Federal Information Proessing Standards (FIPS) program for validating ryptographilibraries [Nat℄. Several Java libraries have undergone suh a validation, some of them areavailable for use as independant software parts. These libraries are RSA BSAFE Crypto-J,IBM SSLite and CryptoLite, Certiom Seurity Builder FIPS Java Module, and EntrustAuthority Seurity Toolkit for the Java Platform.6.3 Algorithm for Bundle Signature and ValidationFigure 25 shows the detailed sequene diagram of the algorithm for signing a bundle.Figure 26 shows the detailed sequene diagram of the algorithm for validating a signedbundle.
13http://java.sun.om/ produts/je/je122_providers.html14http://www.bounyastle.org/ INRIA
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JarSigner KeyStoreManager CryptographicLibrary
privateKey : getPrivateKey(signer, password)
SignedJarManifest
manifest : new(Jar, hashAlgorithm)
SignatureFile
signatureFile : new(manifest, signer)
JarSignerGui
 : sign(jarFile, signer, password)
SignatureBlock
block : new(signatureFile, cert, privateKey)
cert : getCertificate(signer, password)
SignedJarFile
 : buildSignedjarFile
hash : getHashValue(fileData, algo)for all file in archive
hash : getHashValue(manifest, algo)
CMSfile : getCMSFData(signatureFile, cert, privateKey)
boolean : result
Created with Poseidon for UML Community Edition. Not for Commercial Use.
Figure25:TheSequeneDiagramoftheAlgorithmforsigningaBundle.
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Felix JarValidation
 : check(file, password)
SignedJarFile
 : new(file)
Certificate[] : getValidCertificates(password)
boolean : checkCoherence(certificate)for each valid
certificate
KeyStoreManager
boolean : isValid(Certificate, password)for each
certificate
boolean : checkResourceOrderValid()
boolean : checkSignatureBlockValidity(signer)
CryptographicLibrary
boolean : checkCMSDataValidity(signatureFile, block)
boolean : checkSignatureFileValidity(signatureFile, manifest)
boolean : checkHashValue(manifestHash, pretendedHash, algo)
boolean : checkManifestValidity()
boolean : result
boolean : result
boolean : checkHashValue(manifestHash, pretendedHash, algo)for each file
in archive
Created with Poseidon for UML Community Edition. Not for Commercial Use.
Figure26:TheSequeneDiagramoftheAlgorithmforvalidatingasignedBundle.INRIA
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